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Abstract
We analyze the impact of adolescents’ friendship relations in their final-year class of high
school on subsequent labor market success. Based on a typology of network positions we locate
each student within the social system of the school class as either: an isolate, a sycophant,
a broker or a receiver. These positions identify individuals’ social standing within the group
of classmates and proxy for their interpersonal behavior and social competencies. We offer
empirical evidence that differential social standing in adolescence predicts large and persis-
tent earnings disparities over the entire life course. The estimated wage premia and penalties
do not appear to be substantially confounded by measures of family and school resources,
and materialize largely independent of differences in cognitive abilities, grade rank in class or
friends’ characteristics. A moderate share of the earnings inequalities is mediated by differen-
tial post-secondary human and social capital investment. From a conceptual point of view, we
contribute an application of egocentered network methods within conventional labor economic
survey research.
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I Introduction
In his seminal essay “The School Class as a Social System” Talcott Parsons [1959] described the
school class as an agency of socialization through which individual personalities are trained to be
motivationally and technically adequate to the successful performance of their adult roles. When
economists study skill formation and the effects of schooling, they often focus on the development
of technical skills as measured by scores on reading, writing, and mathematics tests. Important
outcomes these may be, the school not only imparts a certain amount of subject knowledge
and general problem solving skills. It also internalizes in its pupils the social competencies and
behavioral norms that make them function adequately on an interpersonal level. The importance
of classmates in this respect should be immediately evident. Classmates constitute the primary
social system, besides the family, in which any adolescent participates. The focus of our work,
then, is on analyzing the effect of students’ social relationships with classmates on subsequent
economic attainment.
The view of the school class as a social system forms the point of departure for our work in
two respects: First of all, it draws our attention to the motivational and behavioral outcomes of
the schooling process. It stresses the fact that social competencies and norms for interpersonal
behavior are not acquired in the abstract. They develop in the relations to others and are the
outcomes of a prolonged socialization process stretching from early childhood in the family and
elementary school until the end of high school. Secondly, viewing the school class as a social
system has an influence on the methodological approach. To us, the most appropriate way of
measuring inherently “relational” concepts is to draw on methods from social network analysis.
We use information on friendship ties to study the structure of social associations in which an
individual is embedded in his final-year class of high school. In particular, a typology of network
positions [Burt 1976, Wasserman and Faust 1994] is constructed that locates each student within
the social system of the respective school class as either: an isolate, a sycophant, a broker or a
receiver. These positions identify individuals’ social standing within the group of classmates and
proxy for their interpersonal behavior and social competencies.
We are certainly not the first to recognize that behavioral skills, loosely defined, form an
important subcomponent of human capital and that schools play a central role in developing such
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skills [Bowles, Gintis and Osborne 2001]. In fact, there is a growing number of studies on the
role of “noncognitive skills” that document how pre-labor market measures of motivation, social
adaptability and interpersonal skills help explaining adult socioeconomic outcomes (e.g. Heckman,
Stixrud and Urzua [2004]). Another recent strand in the literature prefers to study the social
component of human capital under the heading of “individual social capital” [Glaeser, Laibson
and Sacerdote 2002]. Whichever generic term one may favor, both serve as a catchall for acquired
behavioral skills, socialized norms of conduct, as well as inborn pro-social character traits. In
practice, these individual attributes are lumped together as they are empirically indistinguishable.
We follow Glaeser et al. [2002] and adopt their notion of individual social capital since our
approach to measurement is deliberately “sociometric” rather than “psychometric”.
For our empirical analysis, we employ detailed information on high school friendship relations
available from respondents to the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS). Respondents were asked
to report names of up to three best friends from their senior class in high school. We use this
information to represent each high school class as a “directed friendship network” where a link
from student i to classmate j is established whenever the former claims friendship to the latter.
The fact that connections are directed leads to a conceptual distinction: by sponsoring a tie of
friendship, a student reveals his affection towards the recipient of the claim, while by receiving a
claim of friendship a student is the object of social approval.
Following Burt [1976], we treat the position of individuals in their network as a well defined
“set of relations” to and from each actor in the system and construct a typology of four positions
(or roles) according to the similarity of their ties. Isolates are individuals who deliberately do not
promote ties and who do not receive any social approval either. The position of the sycophant
reflects the idea of a person trying to tag along while the attempt to being socially connected is not
reciprocated by others. The mirror image of the sycophant is the receiver, also often referred to
as occupying a “primary position” in the network of relationships. Receivers represent, somewhat
oversimplified, the prototype of socially prestigious actors as they receive social approval without
the need to engage in friendship pacts with other classmates. Those who receive and at the same
time reciprocate by means of promoting friendship ties are classified as brokers. Brokers are also
often referred to as “ordinaries” as they represent the most common position in groups.
Our approach captures the outcomes of a differentiation process during secondary school
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in terms of the “social status” achieved by individuals relative to other individuals within the
same class. To be precise, by school class we mean the set of classes participated in by the
same grade cohort of students in any given school. This broader interpretation is appropriate
here since students tend to specialize in elective subjects towards the end of secondary school.
Members of the class in one subject need not be the same as in another. Individuals have been
systematically exposed to association with different people across various contexts ranging from
mathematics class to organized athletics and extracurricular activities. This implies a considerable
reshuffling of friendships in which students have drifted into new and out of old relationships over
the years. Since association is a choice, the final position in which an individual is observed is
highly informative for identifying different types of personalities and behaviors. Drawing again on
Parsons [1959], we would like to spend a few more words on what we think it is that adolescents
acquire by social interaction with classmates, and why it should matter for their subsequent
economic attainment.
The psychological function of social interaction with classmates is that it provides a testing
field for gaining acceptance from age-peers, that is from “status-equals”. The degree to which an
individual is accepted by his peers is related to the extent to which he is able to make positive
personal and social adjustments. During secondary school, a social differentiation process takes
hold that gradually breaks up the individual’s initial fixation on “generation-superiors” such as
parents, the class teacher from elementary school and other significant adults. The new reference
system is largely independent of adult supervision and approval. Individuals come to occupy
differentiated positions within the group as an immediate consequence of their own interpersonal
behavior and of what others consider appropriate conduct. An individual’s social status is in-
evitably a direct function of the position he achieves within the school class and this position
enters into the definition of his own identity.1 Large parts of an individual’s role performance
when adult, as an employee in a team of co-workers for example, will also be in association with
status-equals or near-equals. By that time, one has to have understood the “rules of the game”
and know how to gain acceptance and social support, whom to trust and when to reciprocate.
1In a study of Illinois high schools, Coleman [1961] finds that students identify themselves as belonging to social
categories such as nerds, jocks, leading crowd and others. Students tend to differentiate themselves along two major
dimensions: ‘cognitive achievement’ as measured by grades, and ‘social approval’ as reflected in leadership roles
in extracurricular student activities and participation in high school athletics. See Akerlof and Kranton [2002] on
“Identity and Schooling” for a review and economic interpretation of the sociological literature on education.
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Therefore, it is social interaction within the group of classmates that provides the bridge to the
adult world in terms of acquired social skills and norms for interpersonal behavior.
We find that differential social standing in adolescence predicts significant and large earnings
inequalities over the adult life course. Two results merit special consideration: students who were
socially isolated within their school class earn between 43 and 25 percent less than average 35
years later, depending on the set of controls entered. Considering the opposite end of the social
spectrum, we find that receiver types earn a wage premium of 33 to 24 percent compared to
an average individual, again, conditioning on different sets of covariates. The estimated wage
premia and penalties do not appear to be substantially confounded by measures of family and
school resources, and materialize largely independent of differences in cognitive abilities, grade
rank in class or friends’ characteristics. We do find, though, that a moderate share of the earnings
inequalities is mediated by differential post-secondary human and social capital investment.
In summary, using citations as a measure of the interest of citors towards citees, we group
individuals into equivalent positions across school classes. The suggested typology is certainly
a crude and highly stylized description of individual differences in social capital. And yet, it
proves to be a very informative one when it comes to explaining individuals’ differential success in
the labor market. From a conceptual point of view, we contribute an application of egocentered
network methods within conventional labor economic survey research. The remainder of the paper
is organized as follows: Section II introduces some elementary concepts of social network analysis,
defines our measures and describes the relational data at hand. Section III examines whether in
our sample there are significant associations between sociometric position in school class and adult
wages. Section IV analyzes the earnings premia and penalties in relation to differential school
resources, family background, cognitive ability, grade rank and peer characteristics. Moreover, we
try to shed some light on possible channels through which the observed earnings inequalities might
have evolved, such as social capital accumulation, post-secondary schooling and occupational
sorting. Section V concludes with some thoughts on the policy relevance of our findings, a
discussion of potential limitations, and directions for future research.
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II Social Network Analysis: Method, Data and Measures
A The Egocentered Network Method
The network approach conceives the social system as a set of individuals (nodes) and patterns of
well specified relations (ties) joining individual members. Network analysis may then be conducted
on two levels: the individual “actor level” or the overall “structural level”. With the latter, interest
usually centers on concepts and measures pertaining to the entire network of relationships, such as
its density or connectedness. On an actor level, one would typically be interested in quantifying the
popularity, influence or sociometric position of an individual within a given network. Depending
on the level of analysis, both, the location of individual actors within the network, as well as
the structural properties of the whole social system may then be related to economic outcomes of
interest. On the structural level, one prominent example would be the work by Granovetter [1974]
on job contact networks in which he relates social structures to market performance. On the actor
level, the discussion in Akerlof and Kranton [2002] on identity and schooling is exemplary as it is
concerned with group dynamics within the school class context.
Clearly, the chosen level of analysis has implications for the kind of network methods that are
appropriate as well as for the type of data required for empirical analysis. If we desire to analyze
the structural properties of a network, we need to gather “complete network data”: information on
all ties linking elements of a closed population. This implies that individual units of observation are
not sampled by some standard probabilistic method as in conventional survey designs. Gathering
full information on relationships among, say, all inhabitants of a small village may still be feasible,
with potential limitations on the inferential side though. As the population of interest widens,
data collection efforts become prohibitively complex and expensive for all practical purposes. It
is immediately obvious that complete network and conventional survey data are largely at odds
with each other.
However, when interest centers on the individual actors within the net of relationships, full
network data might not be required. In many instances, one may resort to “egocentered network
data”: information on sets of ties surrounding sampled nodes.2 In the present work, for instance,
2For an exhaustive discussion of sampling methods in a network context and the analysis of survey network
data, see Marsden [1990].
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we consider a random sample from a population of high school seniors and ask them to report
who are their close friends in class. Data like these do not allow us to map the full network and
analyze its structural properties in great detail. But, the data is still relational in character and
we can find out that some have close friends while others have none. Knowing this, we are able
to understand something about differences in the actors’ position in their (local) social structure
and can relate these varying positions to variation in economic outcomes. This is the approach
taken in our paper.
B High School Friendship Relations in the WLS
We employ detailed information on high school friendship relations available from respondents
to the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS). The WLS consists of 10,317 randomly sampled
individuals who graduated from Wisconsin high schools in 1957. Together, these individuals
constitute approximately one-third of all seniors in Wisconsin high schools in that year. After
the initial wave of data collection, primary respondents were re-interviewed in 1975 and 1992.
Together with their parents’ interview of 1964, these waves provide information on, among others,
socio-economic background, mental ability, educational attainment, family formation, and labor
market histories. The original sample is broadly representative of white men and women who
have completed at least twelve years of schooling. For more detailed information on the WLS be
referred to Sewell et al. [2001] and the references therein.
In the 1975 wave, respondents were asked to report names of up to three best friends from
their senior class in high school. The survey design of the WLS bounds the set of nodes by
school-class membership: claims of friendship can be done only among students who belonged to
the same school and class. Relational quantification is based on individual evaluation: student i
has a tie with student j if and only if i claims his friendship to j. Two things are worth noting in
this context. The first is that we are considering dichotomous relations, either a relation exists
or it does not, while the strength of the relation is not defined. The second is that our relations
are directed, that is, if i claims friendship to j, the reverse is not necessarily true. This leads to
a conceptual distinction between a student who receives a claim of friendship and a student who
sponsors a claim of friendship. The former is socially approved, while the latter shows general
friendliness towards the recipient. There are further three remarks related to measurement of
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friendship ties in the WLS.
First, the questionnaire is a combination of free recall, respondents write down names, and
retrospective fixed choice, they may nominate at most three friends belonging to their class. The
implication of this design for possible measurement error in observed friendship ties is limited.
Indeed, the free recall and the retrospective fixed choice design force the responder to remember
the identity of his (or her) friends at high school and to select at most three of them. This
assures that claims of friendship are towards individuals with whom the respondent experienced
stable patterns of interaction. Second, the information gathered is subjective in nature: the social
relation under analysis, friendship, is perceived independently by the parties involved. Third, due
to random sampling of nodes, we do not have a full description of all relations among students
in any given class. We do observe the full set of ties sponsored by sample members towards
individuals both, in- and outside the sample. But, claims of friendship coming from classmates who
have not participated in the WLS towards sample members are missing. Moreover, individuals
were not sampled randomly on a class level, but sampling occurs at the aggregate level. This
implies that even if the size of the sampled classes would on average be one-third of the original,
there will be classes with higher and lower proportions of students.
Obviously, the value of our analysis hinges on whether the rules for including and excluding
nodes are sensible in the sense of generating indicators that are not artifacts of those rules [see
Marsden 1990]. After having introduced our measures, we will return to this issue and address in
more detail the consequences of sampling portions of a school class network.
C In-degree, Out-degree and Network Positions
We represent each of the school classes in our data as a directed network, g, where a link from
student i to student j is established whenever the former claims friendship to the latter. We
denote a link from i to j as gi,j = 1, while gi,j = 0 means that student i does not claim friendship
to j. Figure 1 illustrates one of the classes in our data; a link from i to j is represented by a
line with an arrow pointing to j. Receiving and sponsoring links may be formalized using two
graph-theoretical notions: the In-degree and the Out-degree. Formally, the Out-degree of student
i, denoted as yi, is the number of claims of friendship he or she sponsors, that is yi =
∑
j gi,j . The
In-degree of student i, denoted as xi, is the number of claims student i receives from others, that
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is xi =
∑
j gj,i. Thus, each actor i is characterized by a bidimensional social vector ei = (xi, yi)
and network positions can be constructed by combining the characteristics of such social vectors
across actors. With the relational data at hand, this approach allows us to partition the set of
sample members into subgroups of people who have the same position within their respective
network.3 Following Burt [1976] and Wasserman and Faust [1994], we define the position of a
student in a given school class in the following way:
A student i in a directed network g is: (i) an Isolate if x i =y i = 0 ; (ii) a Sycophant if xi = 0 and
yi > 0; (iii) a Receiver if xi > 0 and yi = 0 and (iv) a Broker if xi > 0 and yi > 0.
In Figure 1 we exemplify the network positions of students in a fictitious high school class,
with numbered circles representing students and arrowed lines indicating the relations among
them. At the same time, the figure is illustrative of the issues involved in sampling portions of
a school class. Students interviewed by the WLS are drawn inside the large hatched circle, and,
broken lines and dotted circles stand for the unobserved ties and nodes. The implications of the
sampling scheme for measurement are immediately visible. True receivers may be misclassified as
isolates and true brokers as sycophants. True isolates and true sycophants will always be correctly
classified, that is, observed as such.
The isolate position is occupied by a set of students {13,14,15} who are neither promoting
nor receiving citations from other individuals in their network. In network terminology, an isolate
is “infinitely distant” from other individuals. A student in the sycophant position {4,11,16,19}
reflects the idea of a person trying to tag along while the attempt to be socially connected is
not reciprocated by others. The mirror image of the sycophant is the receiver, also often referred
to as being in “primary position”. Receivers {3,7,17,18} represent, somewhat oversimplified, the
prototype of socially prestigious actors. They are those leader-type of individuals who receive
3We have experimented with more complex measures of social status such as “Proximity” and “Power-indices”.
For an overview and definition of those and alternative measures see Wasserman and Faust [1994]. These indices
take into “indirect ties” and they may also distinguish between reciprocated and non-reciprocated ties. Our choice
to consider the most basic definition of network positions is due to the imperfection of our data. As already
noted, we miss information on claims of friendship coming from individuals outside the sample but within the
same class. Further, the survey design constrains each respondent to make at most three claims of friendship.
The consideration of indirect and reciprocated ties would only amplify the issue of measurement error in our data.
By contrast, the network positions we construct allow us to pin down the nature of the misclassification across
positions, yet maintaining their relational nature. For an extensive discussion of different “notions of position” and
their applicability in several areas of social network analysis, see Borgatti and Everett [1992].
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social approval without the need to promote any ties on their own part. Those who receive
approval and are reciprocating in the sense of promoting friendship ties on their own are classified
as brokers.4 Brokers {1,2,5,6,8,9,10,12} are also commonly referred to as “ordinaries” as they
represent the most frequently occupied position.
D Descriptive Statistics and Some Preliminary Checks
For the construction of the above measures we use information of 8,018 respondents to the 1975
questionnaire who provided names of their best friends in 1957. The average number of individuals
observed per graduating class is close to 53 students, ranging from minimally 10 to a maximum
of 130. We use all respondents and the corresponding social relations irrespective of individuals’
characteristics such as gender, religion or race. This allows us to exploit all the relational infor-
mation available in our data. Once the relational measures are constructed, we may treat them
as personal attributes and restrict our attention to any subsample for further empirical analysis.
In order to abstract from gender and discrimination issues in labor force participation and wage
determination, we restrict our attention to 2,514 full-time employed males for whom we have
information on adult earnings and control variables.
In this context, we would like to emphasize that our focus does not lie on explaining “who
links with whom” in terms of characteristics as in Marmaros and Sacerdote [2003] or Alesina and
La Ferrara [2002]. This is certainly not for lack of interest in the research question. It is the
imperfection in our data -the substantial number of missing nodes and ties in each class- that
denies us to get a better handle on this issue. This also implies that we cannot perfectly control for
friends’ characteristics when estimating earnings differentials and purging our estimates of possible
confounding factors. Nevertheless, in Section IV we will make extensive use of information which
could potentially explain a student’s friendship relations and social status within the group. In the
end, since ties tend to occur among persons with similar attributes, conditioning on respondents’
own attributes may be largely collinear with conditioning on characteristics of those he is affiliated
with.
In column 1 of table 1, we report descriptive statistics of all sociometric measures. As
4Throughout the paper we use the term reciprocation in a very broad sense. Ties need not be directed towards
those from whom a claim was received.
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mentioned before, we do not observe claims of friendship coming from individuals outside the
sample, but within the same school class, towards WLS members. This makes the observed in-
degree index, and therefore the network typology we construct, subject to systematic measurement
error. In particular, true receivers may be misclassified as isolates and true brokers as sycophants
while true isolates and true sycophants will always be correctly classified. Since the observed
distribution of types is multinomial, measurement errors are functions of the true values and
correction methods based on classical errors-in-variables (CEV) models do not apply directly.
However, to the extent that we are able to identify the functional relationship between errors and
true values, we are in the position to transform the observed distribution of types such as to make
it conform to CEV assumptions.
Our correction method is based on a measurement error model for multinomial random
variables [Fuller 1987], detailed in the appendix. The measurement errors are represented by
a matrix, each element of which defines the probability that a student whose true type is j, is
wrongly assigned to category i. We derive these misclassification probabilities in two steps. In
the first step, we estimate the (mis)classification that would occur once the links that students
within the sample sponsor towards students outside the sample were ignored. In the second step,
we show that the misclassification induced by the limitations of our data is symmetric in nature
to the one which we estimated in the previous step. This allows us to derive the functional
relationship between the mean of the error variable and the mean of the true variable and to
impose the correction matrix in estimation of the earnings effects.
Column 2 of table 1 presents summary statistics for the corrected measures. Comparing
column 1 with column 2, we note a number of differences between the observed and corrected
classifications. First of all, sycophants and isolates were over-represented while broker and receiver
categories were under-represented. Moreover, it is reassuring to see that after the correction
brokers (ordinaries) constitute the most frequent type. Isolate and receiver categories are about
equal in size and form the two smallest categories. This comes as no surprise. Ranking among
the most popular in class can only hold true for a limited number of students simultaneously.
There must be a “pack” for the leaders-of-the-pack to exist. Moreover, human beings are social
beings. It is therefore also well in line with intuition to find that social isolation is a comparatively
infrequent incident.
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In column 3 of table 1, we analyze the relation between our sociometric measures and class
size. To this end, we simply regress the size of a student’s class (in mean deviation form) on
the full set of dummy variables representing individuals’ various network positions, correcting
for misclassification error and omitting the constant term. We find that having zero out-degree
is positively and significantly associated with being in a larger class. This is an interesting
observation for two reasons. Firstly, the out-degree index is the one we observe without error
and, secondly, this finding is perfectly in line with existing evidence on social participation and
school size. We shall return to this point in a moment. To finish our description, the in-degree
index does not appear to be related to class size at all. For the network typology, we find that being
isolated corresponds to being in a larger class. The remaining three categories, in contrast, appear
to be unrelated to class size. Interestingly, Postlewaite and Silverman [2004] report that the rate
of participation in high school athletics is decreasing in the population of the school. Zero out-
degree and being isolated are two alternative indicators for a lack of initiative to participate and
interact socially. The fact that we reach similar conclusions with alternative measures supports
the view that our variables are sensible proxies for individual social capital.5
We finally investigate possible relations between our sociometric measures and the fraction
of students sampled on a class level. If the measures were mere artifacts of the rules for including
and excluding nodes, we should find sizeable correlations with the fraction of a class sampled.
Column 4 of table 1 shows that such effects are virtually absent. Moreover, when later estimating
the effects of our measures on earnings, we shall always include dummy variables for each school
(class). Since the WLS interviewed students in their final year of high school, that is one class per
school, the two notions coincide and shall be used interchangeably throughout. Controlling for
school fixed effects absorbs anything that is constant among classmates but varies across school
classes. Therefore, we also automatically account for differences in class size or proportion of
students sampled. There is another compelling reason for the inclusion of fixed effects. Our
5At first sight, isolation and class size being negatively related appears counterintuitive. From a statistical
point of view, one would expect the converse: given that individuals match on characteristics, increased class size
increases the likelihood that a given student finds another person being sufficiently self-similar. On the other hand,
there may be a number of offsetting factors about which we can only speculate: One possible explanation could be
that teachers of larger classes adopt pedagogical practices that inhibit social interaction among students to stay in
control. Another potential explanation relates to the way students interact among themselves. Larger classes may
actually be more “anonymous” due to clique formation and segregation of students into disconnected subgroups
[Hallinan and Smith 1989].
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measures refer to the social rank of an individual within a particular class. Comparison of such
relative measures are meaningless across classes. However, in regressions that include fixed effects,
they capture differences in social standing within the same high school class.
III Network Position in School Class and Adult Earnings
Let us start off by examining whether in our data there are sizeable correlations between social
position in school class and wages earned later in life. We are able to measure wages at a relatively
advanced age and thus capture the cumulative effects of differences in network position that have
materialized over the entire life course.
Table 2 compares deviations from mean log wages by out-degree, in-degree and network
position. We consider male workers only and exclude those who are self-employed, work less
than 20 hours per week, and earn less than one dollar per hour. We find that having zero out-
degree leads to a marginally significant 6.9 percent pay penalty while having positive out-degree
is not associated with any significant pay difference compared to the average. The results for the
in-degree measure are distinctly sharper. Not receiving any social approval from class-mates, as
reflected by zero in-degree, leads to a statistically significant 11.4 percent penalty while possessing
positive in-degree receives a significant premium of 9.1 percent relative to the mean. This amounts
to a pay difference of more than 20 percent between individuals who were not mentioned at all
and those who received claims of friendship. It is interesting to note that this difference is driven
to largely equal extents by the penalty associated with zero in-degree and the reward for having
positive in-degree. Overall, we find that receiving (not receiving) has much stronger effects on
wages than sending (not sending).
Considering network positions, our primary variables of interest, it is the harsh penalty for
the isolate that immediately strikes the eye. Social isolation, in the sense of a voluntary choice
of not promoting ties and simultaneously not receiving approval from others, is associated with
more than 40 percent lower average wages. Of course, the definition of isolation employed here
is a highly stylized one and these strong effects apply to a fraction of workers of approximately
6 percent in our sample. And yet, on an individual level, the economic consequences of social
isolation during adolescence appear to be substantial. Turning to the other types, we find that
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the wage of sycophants is 9 percent lower than average. Apparently, individuals who cited others
without having their choices reciprocated fare much better than isolates, but still earn below
average. Individuals who acted as brokers in their respective school class earn 8.6 percent more
than the average. Individuals who maintained a primary position -receiving unreciprocated ties-
in their class network, earn 33 percent more than average 35 years later. As for the isolates, this
large premium applies to only a small fraction of workers in our sample; only 4-5 percent are
classified as receivers.
In summary, we observe a clear ordering in terms of the wage premia and penalties. The
higher the social approval or the more prestigious the position of an actor, the higher the reward.
Those in broker and receiver positions receive a wage premium while sycophants and isolates
are being penalized by the market. All specifications control for school fixed effects and thereby
absorb any differences in class size or fraction of students sampled. Still, to the extent that
network positions depend on relational information available on a class level, the estimated mean
log wages for the various network positions might be unduly influenced by outlying observations.
These concerns relate specifically to subsets of individuals in small classes or classes of which only
a tiny fraction is represented in the data. Columns 4 and 5 provide an informal check on model
sensitivity to outliers by deleting small portions of our reference sample. In the specification of
column 4 we omit individuals in small classes of five sampled students and less. In column 5 we
estimate the model omitting those who were in classes of which less than twenty percent of the
students were interviewed. Note that our earlier estimates appear to be largely insensitive to the
exclusion of these observations. We therefore decide to work with the earlier, and larger, sample
of 2,514 observations in all subsequent analyses.
IV Explaining the Earnings Premia and Penalties
A An Effect of Family and School Characteristics?
In this and the following two subsections our primary focus will be on purging the estimates of the
influence of possible confounding factors. In particular, we move on to account for a relationship
between the social standing of an individual in his school class and aspects of family background.
Growing up in families with less human and financial capital may lead to stigmatization by class
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mates and possibly to social isolation. Similarly, being the son of affluent parents may lead to
many claims of friendship received, for reasons other than a genuine capability of gathering a
large number of affiliates.
Compared to our first, basic, specification (col. 3 of table 2), we introduce arrays of dummy
variables for father’s and mother’s level of education and type of occupation, as well as a continu-
ous measure of respondents’ number of siblings. Parents’ education and type of occupation should
proxy for family resources like wealth and the sibling count controls for the possibility of intersib-
ling competition for scarce family resources. Adding a vector of controls for differences in family
characteristics (col. 1 of table 3; detailed estimates omitted) reduces the coefficients for isolates
and receivers by approximately 5 percentage points each. The estimates for the sycophant and
broker categories are only marginally affected. In relative terms, about 10 percent of the earnings
disparities associated with the various positions appear to work through observable differences in
family background. The estimation results show that the sociometric measures impact strongly
on wages and operate largely independent of family resources and school characteristics.
One may argue that there are unobserved family resources that we are omitting due to the im-
perfect quality of our measures. It is clearly impossible to control for such unobservable variables.
However, inference may be still be drawn about their effects to the extent that these variables are
correlated with choice of school. It is plausible that differences in unobserved family-specific char-
acteristics affect the type of school an individual attends. High social-class parents will decide to
reside in certain neighborhoods, and thereby school districts, or may even afford their child private
school education. However, these potential effects are accounted for by the inclusion of dummy
variables for each school class across all specifications. Indirect evidence therefore suggests that
the estimated pay differences should not primarily reflect omitted, unobserved family resources.
Note, that we also implicitly control away any systematic differences in (unobserved) measures of
school quality such as student-teacher ratio, denominational control, gender composition or racial
heterogeneity.
B A Proxy for Intelligence or Grade Rank in Class?
Another potential reason for disparities in the average adult outcomes across network positions
may be correlation with some productive unobservable related to ability. The WLS has a com-
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prehensive measure of adolescent cognitive ability collected in the initial survey year. Adding
standardized scores on the Henmon-Nelson Test of Mental Ability to the previous specification
as proxy for individual differences in intelligence reduces our estimates further (col. 2 of table
3). The coefficient for isolates drops by another 5 percentage points, while the estimates for the
other types are only marginally altered. Despite this reduction, an isolate still faces a significant
and very large penalty of 32.6 percent compared to the wage of an average individual. Compared
to our first, basic, specification (col. 3 of table 2), this indicates that roughly 80 percent of the
adverse effects of adolescent social isolation work independently of family background, school
characteristics and cognitive ability.
One may object that while cognitive ability may be accurately observed by the econometri-
cian, it is not by class mates. And, since our relational measures are based on social interaction,
conditioning on alternative measures of ability that are readily observable to the individuals under
study might be more sensible. Suppose now that our sociometric measures were proxying for a
student’s relative position in terms of grades within his class. The WLS reports rank in high
school graduating class by percentiles. Comparisons of this variable across high schools -much
alike our network positions- are meaningless. However, in regressions that include high school
fixed effects, it captures differences in academic performance within the same high school class.
Accounting for differences in class rank (col. 3) has very similar effects to conditioning on IQ-
scores. Moreover, introducing both measures simultaneously (col. 4) shows that class rank adds
very little to explaining the estimated penalties and premia beyond the specification with only
IQ-scores. We interpret these results as to suggest that a substantial portion of the pay differences
is not due to selection on cognitive traits. Rather, our results indicate that social rank in school
class may have an economically substantial direct influence on later wages.
C An Effect of Friends’ Characteristics?
Controlling for high school fixed effects absorbs anything that is constant among classmates but
varies across school classes. We thereby purge our estimates of the possible confounding influences
of peer characteristics at a fairly general contextual level. This means that we implicitly account
for variables such as peers’ average IQ, the percentage of classmates that is planning college, and
peers’ household characteristics such as average parental income and education. Having said this,
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one may argue that we are ignoring a contextual level that is more influential than classmates.
This second level of context refers to characteristics of the subset of classmates who are being
considered friends by the individuals in our sample. The most natural approach would of course
be to take averages over characteristics of those classmates who were mentioned as friends by our
primary respondents. Due to the missing data issue we opt for a different route.
The WLS allows us to partial out these effects to some extent through detailed information
on an alternative question asking “what most of respondent’s friends in 1957 were going to do:
attending college, getting jobs, going into military service, or doing something else”. Column
5 of table 3 presents results from a regression in which we add to our reference specification
(col. 1) a set of indicator variables for what respondent’s friends were doing. The coefficients
should be interpreted as estimated payoffs relative to an omitted reference category in which we
pooled all those who were doing something else or had missing information. We find that friends’
characteristics, mainly through the decision to attend college, have an independent positive impact
on respondents’ wages. However, compared to column 1, the effect of controlling for friends’
characteristics on the estimated pay differences is negligible. This finding is consistent with
the fact that social ties tend to occur among persons with similar attributes. Conditioning on
respondents’ own attributes is likely to capture most of these potentially confounding influences.
D Does it Work through Social Capital Accumulation?
So far, we did not control for variables such as postsecondary schooling, marital status, or occu-
pation which are choice variables and therefore endogenous. Instead, we looked at reduced-form
wage equations that conditioned on variables determined before post-secondary education and
pre-labor market: school resources, family background, cognitive ability, grade rank and friends’
characteristics.
Here, we depart from that route and start investigating the channels through which position
in school class influences later wages. A channel that is likely to be of great importance is
the accumulation of social capital in the course of one’s labor market career. Joining a social
network may be one of the most common forms of social capital investment. These networks
could be anything ranging from labor unions, political clubs and hobby groups to broad classes
of individuals with a common social characteristic such as the same nationality. In all cases,
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organizational participation diminishes social distance between the individual and some social
group. This leads to information flows, which usually serve both the investor and the other
members of the network.
The empirical work on social capital often uses survey responses about the number of orga-
nization or group memberships and the frequency of contact with friends and family members
as proxies for social capital [Glaeser et al. 2002, Durkin 2000]. The WLS asked respondents
about the extent of their social participation in a variety of different groups, associations, clubs
and organizations. The data set also contains detailed information on frequency of contact with
friends and relatives. We are therefore in the fortunate position to be able to disentangle how
much of the effects of adolescent social capital on market outcomes work through current social
participation.
First, we construct a variable representing the total number of group memberships. This
variable is based on a simple count of memberships, ignoring the intensity of participation. In
forming this measure, we exclude the subset of organizations with a strong consumption compo-
nent.6 This ensures that our measure properly reflects the current stock of an individual’s social
capital investments. Second, we derive an alternative measure that tries to capture variation in
the extent to which people are active in the various groups. We simply weight the number of
memberships by the intensity of participation.7 As mentioned earlier, another very common set
of proxy variables for social capital is related to the frequency of contact with friends and family
members. The WLS collected information on how many times, if at all, during the past four
weeks respondents have gotten together socially with friends and relatives, respectively.
Table 4 presents results from regressions in which we add to our set of explanatory variables
various measures proxying for the current stock of individuals’ social capital. All specifications
6Our measures include any participation in church, church-connected groups, labor unions, veterans’ organi-
zations, business or civic groups, parent-teacher associations, community centers, organizations of people of same
nationality, youth groups, professional groups, political clubs, neighborhood improvement organizations, charity
and welfare organizations. We follow Glaeser et al. [2002] and exclude fraternal organizations and lodges, sport
teams, country clubs, and hobby groups. If there was some missing data and some valid data on participation
items, the missing data was counted as not being involved in that organization. If the entire social participation
section had missing data codes, individuals were treated as not being involved. However, we included a flag for
these observations in our regressions in order to distinguish them from non-participating respondents. This and all
subsequent log transformations of participation counts are done as follows: log(n+1). Of course, this is not a fully
accurate treatment of non-participation, but it is an approximation that may be sufficient for our purposes.
7For intensity weighted participation, the WLS coded the degree of activity in the following way: no involvement
(0), very little (1), some (2), quite a bit (3), a great deal of involvement (4).
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control for school fixed effects, differences in family background and IQ, that is, those factors
that have been shown to be of relevance in earlier specifications. Detailed results of this baseline
model are presented again in column 1 for ease of comparison (c.f. col. 2 of table 3). Adding
the log number of memberships (col. 2) reduces the coefficient for the isolates by 3.7 percentage
points and the premia for receivers by 2.3 percentage points. The remaining two categories are
only weakly affected, the estimates being reduced by less than half a percentage point. Using the
alternative membership measure that weights participation by the intensity of involvement (col.
3) leaves this picture virtually unchanged. Our estimations also indicate that the wage disparity
among types is certainly not due to current frequency of contacts with friends and relatives (cols. 4
and 5). The estimated effects are almost identical to what they were in the absence of conditioning
on contacts. In sum, this suggests that about 10 percent of the pay differences for receivers and
isolates are mediated through their current stock/lack of social capital (col. 6).8
E Other Channels
The model underlying our empirical results views the network position youths maintain by their
late teens as a predetermined initial condition that shapes the future path of human and social
capital accumulation and, hence, wages. In this last subsection we look at an array of alternative
channels like post-secondary schooling, marriage, job finding and type of occupation through
which the earnings gaps might develop. Detailed regression results are presented in table 5. As
before, all specifications control for school fixed effects, differences in family background and IQ
(see col. 1 of table 4 for the baseline model).
Post-Secondary Schooling.— The positive relationship between social capital and human cap-
ital variables is one of the most robust empirical regularities in the social capital literature; see for
example, Helliwell and Putnam [1999]. One explanation for this connection is that schooling plays
a central role in developing such skills [Bowles and Gintis, 2002]. Another possible explanation
is that the marginal value of social participation is increasing in the level of individual human
capital. Since our sample is based on a cohort of equal age individuals who all completed high
8Receivers, along with brokers, are those individuals who are most frequently involved in organizations. Inter-
estingly though, receivers appear to have much less contact with friends and relatives than any other type (see
table A1). One reason might be that receivers -earning the highest wages- have a high opportunity cost of time
and substitute away from family and friendship ties towards organizational memberships.
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school, differences in human capital accumulation are identified by differences in post-secondary
educational attainment. Including the years of schooling completed as a control variable in our
regression (col. 1 of table 5) shows that there are some complementarities between initial levels
of social capital and subsequent human capital accumulation. Overall, the nature and magnitude
of the effects is very similar to what we found when conditioning on social participation variables.
Marriage.— Finding a partner for life and getting married is “relational” in the most literal
sense. Virtually all cross-sectional wage studies find that currently married men earn a premium
in the labor market, holding other characteristics constant [e.g. Korenman and Neumark, 1991].
This finding is relevant for the present work to the extent that our measures of adolescent social
capital impact on later marriage decisions. The results presented in column 2, conditioning
on being currently married, show only insignificant changes in the estimates. The largest change
occurs for the isolate with a 1.6 percentage point reduction compared to the reference specification.
The direction of the effect suggests that those who were isolates during high school tend to be
married less frequently at later ages. However, the extent to which this mediates the wage gap
compared to other types is very moderate.
Job Finding.— It is well recognized that the social ties of an individual may play an impor-
tant role for the kind of search methods that are used by job seekers [e.g. Montgomery, 1991;
Granovetter, 1974]. Many workers make use of informal contacts to former co-workers and ac-
quaintances in their job search, instead of relying on employment agencies or direct application.
Montgomery [1991], to quote one example, reports that approximately 50 percent of all workers
currently employed found their jobs through informal channels, with the frequency of alternative
job-finding methods varying somewhat by gender and occupation. Based on a question about
how WLS respondents’ got to know that their current job was available, we constructed an indi-
cator variable for their job-finding method. Responses are classified into two categories; informal
contacts like friends or acquaintances, former co-workers, teachers, clergypersons, relatives, and
formal channels like employment agencies, newspapers and professional meetings or conferences.
We note that the job-finding method does not appear to impact on wages itself and is also not
mediating much of the wage disparities across types (col. 3).
Occupation Choice.— To investigate the correlation between pre-labor market measures of
interpersonal skills and the distribution of workers across occupations, we condition directly on
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single-digit occupation codes based on the Bureau of the Census classification system (cols. 4
and 5). Our results document that the earnings differentials among types are not complementary
with any particular vocational path. This lends little empirical support to a productivity model
in which more socially skilled workers are observed in greater proportions in occupations where
such skills are rewarded. Our measures appear to proxy some social attribute that is generally
valued in the labor market, irrespective of an individual’s occupation.
V Discussion
This study was motivated by a growing interest in the behavioral outcomes of the schooling process
and their relevance for individuals’ subsequent success in the labor market. We adopted the view of
the school class as a social system in which classmates assume important socialization functions.
They provide an environment of status-equals in the absence of direct adult supervision and
control. Social interaction and voluntary informal association with classmates may be viewed as a
kind of early on-the-job training in the business of interpersonal behavior. This contrasts sharply
with top-down instructions from generation superiors in the familial context but also through
teachers in formal class room situations. Even though the school remains largely adult-controlled
and teachers play a role of outstanding importance, it is the dimension of social interaction among
equals that we consider fundamental to the development of behavioral skills valued in the labor
market.
Based on detailed information on adolescents’ friendship relations, our network approach
allowed us to utilize a number of sociometric measures that position individuals within the so-
cial system of their high school class. We presented evidence that differential social standing
in adolescence causes large and persistent earnings disparities over the entire life course. The
estimated wage premia and penalties do not appear to be substantially confounded by measures
of family and school resources, nor are they proxying for differences in cognitive abilities, grade
rank in class or peer characteristics. Our results indicate, though, that a moderate fraction of the
earnings inequalities is mediated through post-secondary human and social capital accumulation.
Interestingly, the structure of the effects we find corresponds very well with different levels of
“youth-culture” that Parsons [1959] identified in his essay: There is a middle level without clear
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status-differentiation in which individuals are characterized by “being a good fellow” in the sense
of general friendliness and readiness to take responsibility in the informal group when something
needs to be done. In our view, individuals in sycophant and broker positions correspond to this
middle level. Above this, there is a level of “outstanding popularity” characterized by persons with
qualities of “leadership” who are turned to where unusual responsibilities are required. Clearly,
these are those who occupy primary positions within the network of relationships, that is, receiver-
type of individuals. Below the middle level are those with behavioral patterns bordering on
delinquency, withdrawal, and generally unacceptable behavior –the socially isolated in our study.
This last level is the one that is clearly “dysfunctional” compared to expectations of appropriate
behavior.
The results for the socially isolated deserve special attention. The magnitude of the wage
differential, relative to an average person, is enormous: between 40 and 25 percent, depending
on the set of controls entered (col. 3 of table 2 and col. 6 of table 5). Much more importantly
though, the case of social isolation may be key to understanding what kind of valuable skills are
acquired through social interaction with classmates. The graph theoretical notion of an isolate
being “infinitely distant” is a lucid illustration. Isolates provide us with the counterfactual of what
happens if socialization pressures do not reach individuals. Many research studies have shown that
persons with low social acceptability among peers are generally characterized as shy, withdrawing
individuals or as noisy, rebellious, socially ineffective persons. They lack the interpersonal skills
and social adaptability that others have acquired from working in groups, participating in student
clubs and athletics, all of which foster informal association with classmates. These are also the
broad conclusions that other authors have drawn before us, using different data and measures.
What we contribute to the literature is a parallel set of findings based on a decidedly micro-
sociological approach, both in terms of perspective and method.
Related Literature.— There are many studies that emphasize the economic importance of
participation in social activities. One very recent and related example is Postlewaite and Silver-
man [2004], who examine social isolation in terms of voluntary nonparticipation in high school
athletics.9 They conclude that the observed earnings differences are not primarily due to selection
9In terms of the layout of our empirical analysis, we borrow fairly generally from their companion paper on teen
height and labor market outcomes (Persico, Postlewaite and Silverman 2004)
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on predetermined characteristics, but reflect valuable skills acquired through social interaction.
Earlier work on the effects of high school athletic participation and education and labor market
outcomes includes Barron et al. [2000], and Maloney and McCormick [1993]. We have already
mentioned in the introduction that there is a growing literature on behavioral and psychological
variables (e.g. Carneiro and Heckman [2004]) and labor market outcomes. This line of work draws
a number of important conclusions in relation to our analysis. First of all, despite some differences
in naming, it points out the relevance of noncognitive abilities in shaping socioeconomic success.
Secondly, it stresses that human capital accumulation (including the social capital components) is
a dynamic life cycle process. Behavioral skills, broadly defined, develop in the relations to others
and are the outcomes of a prolonged process of socialization stretching from early childhood in
the family, through the entire schooling phase, and quite possibly continuing “on-the-job”.
Limitations.— There are limitations that our work shares with virtually all studies in the
literature. To begin with, what kind of valuable social skills are being identified? The fact that we
are still struggling with generic terms like noncognitive skills or individual social capital is indica-
tive of the state of the field. A great variety of individual behavioral and personality attributes
are lumped together in practice, for lack of anything better. No single factor has yet assumed a
comparable role among the noncognitive abilities as the common g-factor on the cognitive side,
and we agree with Heckman and Rubinstein [2001, p.145] that “it is unlikely that one will ever be
found”. Comparing GED recipients with other high school dropouts and comparing isolates with
average students are two alternative routes to identify valuable interpersonal skills. But, it is not
entirely clear whether a GED recipient, for instance, is different from other dropouts because this
person lacks persistence, discipline and motivation, or because of something else. GEDs might
also be those cross-pressured individuals who could potentially be upwardly mobile due to their
cognitive skills, but who would need to “burn their bridges” with family and status peers to do so.
Social disapproval may pressure them to behave in a regressive manner and to show indifference
to their school performance. The upshot of our discussion here is that explanations based on
psychological factors are not the whole story and that much of the existing evidence is equally
consistent with a micro-sociological interpretation. Both approaches leave it to future studies to
examine which factors in particular are being captured.
There remains the related question of how much of individual social capital is due to psycho-
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logical dispositions -largely influenced by genetic inheritance- and how much is acquired through
socialization pressures? From the point of view of social psychology, it is well-recognized that
interpersonal behavior is shaped to a significant degree by the personal dispositions of the indi-
viduals involved. Our measures of interpersonal associations may therefore simply reflect differ-
ences in inborn personality traits. Fortunately, the personality inventory of the WLS affords us a
comprehensive set of variables to address this issue. In regression analyses not detailed here, we
have included measures of respondents’ character dispositions at age 53, based on the Five-Factor
Model (FFM) of personality structure [Costa and McCrae 1992, Goldberg 1990]. According to the
FFM, five independent categories are sufficient to describe individual personality differences at
the broadest level of abstraction: extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and
openness to experience. FFM traits are shown to have a statistically significant and economically
important impact on wages [Mueller and Plug, 2004]. We find similar effects here, however, con-
ditioning on these dispositional measures leaves the estimated earnings premia and penalties on
sociometric position largely unaffected. Our interpretation of the evidence is that there are valu-
able skills acquired through interaction with classmates and that subsequent earnings disparities
do not primarily reflect selection on predetermined personality traits.
Some Thoughts on Human Capital Policy.— When economists study skill formation and
analyze treatment effects of policy programs, they often focus on the development of cognitive
skills as measured by performance on ACT or SAT college entrance exams (e.g. Krueger and
Whitmore [2001]). In contrast, our analysis emphasizes the importance of the social component
in human capital formation and thereby adds another dimension to the outcome space along which
interventions have to be evaluated. This point has been made earlier by Carneiro and Heckman
[2004]. What we want to add to the discussion is a conceptual consideration that follows directly
from our micro-sociological stance.
Let us take the example of a policy that seeks to increase the quality of schooling by means
of a class size reduction. The underlying mechanism is of course that a given amount of school
resources is shared by a smaller number of pupils, a reduced student-teacher ratio being one
example. Whatever the precise setup of the experiment, by focussing on the consequences for
performance on cognitive ability tests, one important outcome is left out of consideration: the
group structure of the school class is affected. There exists an extensive literature in sociology
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of education which examines the effects that classroom characteristics have an impact on the
formation of friendships among classmates (see e.g. Hallinan [1979], and Hallinan and Smith
[1989]). This work provides strong empirical evidence suggesting that both, pedagogical practices
and class size, play a crucial role in the determination of the structural properties of school class
social networks. For example, an empirical regularity is that social networks of larger classes
exhibit a higher number of disconnected groups, which implies a higher level of segregation within
the class.
When discussing the relation between our measures of position and class size we found a
positive relation between being socially isolated and being in a bigger class. Such a relation was
absent for the other types. It appears that student networks in smaller classes exhibit a higher
degree of connectedness with fewer nodes being infinitely distant. Reducing class size means
reducing social distance among members and, on an individual level, implies a lower incidence of
social isolation. This would avoid its adverse consequences in terms of individuals’ earnings and
quite possibly many other important life outcomes. Obviously, with our data we cannot provide
a proper treatment effect analysis of class size reduction. Nevertheless, our discussion strongly
suggests that there may be significant “side effects” affecting the formation of the social capital
component in human capital. It is important to recognize that there are multiple channels of
influence and a number of outcome dimensions when designing educational policies and evaluating
them in terms of their effects, costs and benefits.
Closing Remarks.— With our paper, we sought to contribute a compelling example of the
potential that lies in egocentered network methods for survey-based economic research. Our
simple application provided a methodological preview on the wide applicability of social network
analysis and economic relevance of sociological concepts. A number of areas for further research
open-up from here. First, one could extend our analysis and relate individuals’ social status
to other economically relevant choices and outcomes. Table A1 is suggestive of the fact that
social capital investment and marriage decisions or job search channels are likely to be interesting
candidates. From this perspective, the use of egocentered network methods may complement the
existing literature on individual social capital in vein of Glaeser et al. [2002] by providing a rich
set of alternative measures.
Second, given our strong findings in terms of adult earnings inequalities, it is immediate to ask
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which are the idiosyncratic and institutional factors leading to the emergence of differential social
standing. In other words, we could treat the sociometric position of a person within a group as
the dependent variable. The emergence of individuals’ social status may be influenced by the size
of the class, by gender composition and racial heterogeneity within the class, or by factors such as
type, quality and denominational control of a school. Similarly, classmates’ family characteristics,
cognitive ability and future plans, among others, may directly influence the decision of students
to interact with one another. Such analysis would contribute to the recent literature addressing
the determinants of social interaction (Alesina and La Ferrara [2002], Marmaros and Sacerdote
[2003]).
Third, network analysis could prove highly instrumental for the emerging field on the im-
portance of sociological concepts within economics (recently summarized by Gibbons [2004]). It
equips the economist with a rigorous toolbox to approach many inherently relational concepts of
interest, such as trust, identity and social capital. The most problematic aspect is the availability
of accurate relational data and -at the same time- measures of relevant economic outcomes. In
light of what has been said earlier, we note that complete network data collection and conven-
tional survey designs are not always incompatible. If the social system of interest is bounded to
a reasonable size, like the school classes in our study, one could easily collect information on the
full set of ties among students. Sampling could then occur on the class instead of the individual
level. Moreover, longitudinal data containing repeated observations of social associations among
the same set of individuals would allow us to study the formation and evolution of friendship
patterns during school time. This would open up the possibility for treatment effect analysis of a
variety of policies affecting the structural characteristics of a school or a classroom. In our view,
increased efforts to integrate the collection of egocentered network data into conventional survey
designs are likely to bear great potential for future work.
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Appendix
A Misclassification Error in the Role Typology
The observation process consists of assigning each of the n students in our sample to one of four
mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories: isolate, sycophant, broker and receiver. We denote
each observation as a vectorAt. If the t-th sample element is placed in the first category (‘isolate’)
of the classification, we write At = (1, 0, 0, 0); if the t-th sample element is placed in the second
category (‘sycophant’), we write At = (0, 1, 0, 0); and similarly for the remaining two categories.
The j-th element of the At vector, denoted by Atj is a binomial random variable that takes the
values zero and one. It follows that the observed distribution of At obtained by making a single
determination on each student in our random sample is multinomial.
We formalize the measurement error process according to the right-wrong model for multino-
mial variables as outlined by Fuller (1987). According to this model, every student truly belongs
to one and only one of the four categories. The measurement error is characterized by a set of
misclassification probabilities κAij , where κAij is the probability that a student whose true cat-
egory is j is (wrongly) assigned to category i. To give an example, the first column of the κA
matrix contains the misclassification probabilities for the isolate. That is, conditional on truly
being an isolate, it contains the probability that a student actually is classified as an isolate,
or misclassified as a sycophant, a receiver or a broker. It is assumed that every element in true
category j has the same vector of misclassification probabilities, that is, we ignore individual fixed
effects in measurement error.
B Correcting the OLS Estimates
It is clear that with multinomial variables, the expected value and the variance of the measure-
ment error are functions of the true values. Therefore, classical errors-in-variables (CEV) models
that are useful when continuous variables are measured with additive noise do not apply in this
situation. However, if the matrix κA of misclassification probabilities is known, one can transform
the observations At as to make the model conform to CEV assumptions.
Now, consider a simple regression equation where we insert dummy variables based on our
multinomial data as explanatory variables. Assume that the vector of true values xt satisfies the
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following linear model
Yt = xtβ + et, At = xt + ξt, (1)
where xt is a 4-dimensional vector with a one in the jth position and zeros elsewhere when student
t is in the jth category. The equation error et is assumed to be independent of xt and independent
of the error ξt made in determining xt. Then, if we apply the following transformation to the
observed vector
X′t = κ
−1
A A
′
t, (2)
we obtain Xt = xt+ut, with E{ut} = 0 and E{Xi | i = t} = xt for all t. Therefore, the vectors
Xt, xt, ut are conform to CEV assumptions of zero mean errors that are uncorrelated with the
true values.
Due to the transformation applied, we can now write
ΣXX = Σxx +Σuu, (3)
with
Σuu = κ−1A ΣAAκ
−1 ′
A −Σxx,
ΣAA = diag(µA1, µA2, µA3, µA4)− µ′AµA,
Σxx = diag(µx1, µx2, µx3, µx4)− µ′xµx.
(4)
This is the classical errors-in-variables decomposition where the variance of the observed values
ΣXX is modelled as the sum of a true variance (‘signal’) component Σxx and an error variance
(‘noise’) component Σuu. The observed sample proportions and the true population proportions
of isolates, sycophants, brokers and receivers are denoted by µA = (µA1, µA2, µA3, µA4) and
µx = (µx1, µx2, µx3, µx4) respectively.10 For detailed derivations and proofs see Fuller (1987).
Then, a consistent estimator of β is
βˆ = (X ′X − Σˆuu)−1X ′Y (5)
10Knowing κA, an estimator of the vector of true proportions is given by µˆ
′
x = κ
−1
A µ
′
A. The fact that µx must
be estimated, introduces some error into Σˆuu (and therefore into the variance of the estimator of β) which we have
to ignore here.
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and the variance covariance matrix of the estimator is obtained as
Var{βˆ} = s2(X ′X − Σˆuu)−1X ′X(X ′X − Σˆuu)−1, (6)
where
s2 = (y′y − βˆ(X ′X − Σˆuu)βˆ′)/(n− p), (7)
is the root mean square error and p the number of estimated parameters.
C Derivation of κA
We have shown that if the functional relationship between the mean of the error variable and the
mean of the true variable is known, a transformation can be applied to the original observations
such as to obtain errors conform to CEV assumptions. The question is of course how to obtain
an estimate of κA. We again denote the mean vector for the observed proportions as
µ′A = κAµ
′
x (8)
where µ′x is the vector of true proportions and κA is the matrix containing the misclassification
probabilities conditional on the type. Consider the following two thought experiments.
First, suppose we started from an ideal situation in which we observed all ties, incoming and
outgoing. In this case individuals would be classified correctly and there would be no difference
between observed and true proportions µ′x. Now, let us remove all those links that students within
the sample receive from students outside the sample and denote the observed proportions by µ′A1 .
What can we say about the relation between µ′A1 and µ
′
x, in other words, what is the nature of
the misclassification error that occurs if some of the incoming links are ignored? Obviously, true
isolates and true sycophants will never be misclassified, that is, they are always observed as such.
But, a true receiver could be misclassified as an isolate and a true broker could be misclassified
as a sycophant. This allows us to define the matrix of misclassification probabilities as
κA1 =

1 0 0 β
0 1 α 0
0 0 1− α 0
0 0 0 1− β

(9)
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with α, β ∈ (0, 1). In particular, α (resp. β) denotes the probability that a true broker (resp.
receiver) is misclassified as a sycophant (resp. isolate).
Second, suppose again to start from the ideal situation with in-degree and out-degree fully
observed, µ′x. However, now we remove the links that individuals within the sample sponsor
towards individuals outside the sample and denote the observed proportions by µ′A2 . That is,
what can we say about the relation between µ′A2 and µ
′
x when some of the outgoing links are
ignored? Here, a true sycophant may be misclassified as an isolate and a true broker as a receiver,
while true isolates and true receivers will always be observed as such. Thus,
κA2 =

1 γ 0 0
0 1− γ 0 0
0 0 1− δ 0
0 0 δ 1

(10)
with γ, δ ∈ (0, 1). Here, γ (resp. δ) denotes the probability that a true sycophant (resp. broker)
is misclassified as an isolate (resp. receiver).
Let us compare the two experiments. Under both schemes, the deletion of links occurs
randomly since individuals have been sampled randomly. This implies a clear symmetry in terms
of the effects on the observed proportions. Symmetry means that a fraction α of true brokers is
misclassified as sycophants after performing the first experiment, a fraction δ of true brokers is
misclassified as receivers after the second experiment and α = δ. The same argument can be made
for β and γ. Compared to the ideal situation, a fraction β of true receivers will be misclassified as
isolates due to deletion of incoming links; a fraction γ of true sycophants will be misclassified as
isolates due to deletion of outgoing links. Since deletion occurs randomly, we will have symmetric
effects in terms of misclassification probabilities, that is β = γ.
We are now ready to derive the κA in the following way. First, using all available information
in our data we observe µ′A1 = [0.080, 0.523, 0.377, 0.020]; see also column 1 of table 1. Then, we
ignore all ties sponsored by sample members to non-WLS classmates and re-calculate the mean
proportions, µ′A3 = [0.372, 0.231, 0.277, 0.120]. We observe outflows from the sycophant to the
isolate category and from the broker to the receiver category. This comes as no surprise since
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the relation between µ′A1 and µ
′
A3
in terms of misclassification probabilities is identical to the
one between µ′x and µ
′
A2
. Therefore, solving µ′A3 = κA2µ
′
A1
allows us to determine γ = 0.558
and δ = 0.265. As we have shown above, these probabilities equal β and α respectively. This
yields the desired correction matrix κA1 . The estimates for the unobserved true proportions
µ′x are provided in column 2 of table 1. The correction of the observed in-degree classification
(zero versus positive) follows the same procedure, except that here we simply have two categories
instead of four.
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Data and Programs
Support for collection and dissemination of data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study has
been provided by the National Institute on Aging (AG-9775), the National Science Foundation
(SBR-9320660), the Spencer Foundation, and the Center for Demography and Ecology and the
Vilas Estate Trust at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Only we bear the responsibility for the
further analysis or interpretation of these data. Copies of the computer programs used to generate
the results presented in this paper are available upon request. Data and documentation from the
Wisconsin Longitudinal Study are available at http://dpls.dacc.wisc.edu/WLS/wlsarch.htm.
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TABLE 1
Distribution of Out-degree, In-degree, Network Positions and
their Relation to Class Size and Fraction of Class Sampled
Observed Corrected for Class Size Fraction Sampled
Proportions Misclassification %∆ to average %∆ to average
A. Out-degree
zero .099 .099 .235 – .030
(.055) (.010)
positive .901 .901 – .026 .003
(.018) (.003)
B. In-degree
zero .603 .443 .026 – .010
(.032) (.006)
positive .397 .557 – .021 .008
(.027) (.005)
C. Network Position
Isolate .080 .056 .346 – .030
(.102) (.019)
Sycophant .523 .387 – .025 – .006
(.034) (.006)
Broker .377 .514 – .027 .010
(.028) (.005)
Receiver .020 .043 .092 – .031
(.124) (.024)
Note.— The sample consists of 2,514 full-time employed (white) male workers in the WLS
for whom we have information on friendship ties, hourly wages at age 53 and covariates
(see Table A1 for descriptive statistics).
TABLE 2
OLS Estimates ln(Wage) Equation for Adult, Male Workers, WLS, at Age 53
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Out-degree 0 – .069
(.039)
Out-degree >0 .008
(.012)
In-degree 0 – .114
(.027)
In-degree >0 .091
(.022)
Network Position
Isolate – .426 – .416 – .417
(.110) (.109) (.102)
Sycophant – .090 – .091 – .089
(.026) (.026) (.028)
Broker .086 .085 .085
(.021) (.021) (.022)
Receiver .330 .327 .311
(.139) (.138) (.134)
Observations 2,514 2,514 2,514 2,413 2,364
Adjusted R2 .043 .063 .077 .077 .070
F -statistic typology 26.31 25.07 21.44
Note.— Standard errors are in parentheses. See the note to Table 1. Log hourly wages
and controls are in mean-deviation form; the constant term is suppressed. All specifications
include a set of dummy variables for each high school class; one reference category omitted.
Column (4) excludes individuals in small classes of five students and less. Column (5)
excludes all those who were in classes of which less than twenty percent has been sampled.
TABLE 3
OLS Estimates ln(Wage) Equation for Adult, Male Workers, WLS, at Age 53
Controlling for Family Background, IQ, Class Rank and Peer Effects
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Network Position
Isolate – .378 – .326 – .318 – .311 – .354 – .298
(.110) (.106) (.110) (.107) (.111) (.107)
Sycophant – .083 – .068 – .073 – .066 – .080 – .065
(.026) (.025) (.026) (.025) (.026) (.025)
Broker .079 .061 .066 .058 .074 .056
(.021) (.021) (.021) (.021) (.021) (.021)
Receiver .289 .304 .280 .299 .291 .301
(.139) (.134) (.139) (.134) (.138) (.134)
IQ-score .164 .142 .140
(.012) (.014) (.014)
Class rank (log) .116 .042 .038
(.013) (.015) (.015)
Respondent’s friends
planning college .076 .052
(.022) (.021)
getting jobs .019 .017
(.022) (.021)
military service .007 .018
(.019) (.018)
Observations 2,514 2,514 2,514 2,514 2,514 2,514
Adjusted R2 .109 .177 .142 .180 .118 .182
F -statistic typology 21.44 17.20 16.48 15.97 19.52 15.24
Note.— Standard errors are in parentheses. Log hourly wages and controls are in mean-
deviation form; the constant term is suppressed. All specifications control for high school fixed
effects and include sets of indicator variables for parental education and occupation as well as
continuous controls for the number of siblings (results omitted). See Table A1 for details and
summary statistics.
TABLE 4
OLS Estimates ln(Wage) Equation for Adult, Male Workers, WLS
Controlling for Measures of Social Participation and Contacts at Age 53
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Network Position
Isolate – .326 – .289 – .289 – .325 – .325 – .289
(.106) (.107) (.107) (.106) (.106) (.107)
Sycophant – .068 – .065 – .065 – .067 – .067 – .065
(.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025)
Broker .061 .057 .056 .058 .060 .056
(.021) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.020)
Receiver .304 .281 .283 .322 .304 .282
(.134) (.134) (.134) (.134) (.134) (.135)
No. of member- .109 .101
ships in org. (log) (.020) (.021)
No. of member- .086
ships in org.‡(log) (.015)
Freq. of contact .060 .056
with friends (log) (.017) (.018)
Freq. of contact – .043 – .065
with relatives (log) (.018) (.019)
Observations 2,514 2,514 2,514 2,514 2,514 2,514
Adjusted R2 .177 .190 .191 .182 .180 .195
F -statistic typology 17.20 14.55 14.53 17.50 17.06 14.52
Note.— Standard errors are in parentheses. Log hourly wages and controls are in mean-
deviation form; the constant term is suppressed. All specifications control for high school fixed
effects and include indicator variables for parental education and occupation as well as contin-
uous controls for the number of siblings and iq-scores (see Table A1 for descriptives).
‡ This variable weights the number of membership in organizations by the intensity of respon-
dents’ involvement.
TABLE 5
OLS Estimates ln(Wage) Equation for Adult, Male Workers, WLS
Controlling for Other Outcome Measures, at Age 53
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Network Position
Isolate – .287 – .310 – .329 – .336 – .293 – .244
(.104) (.106) (.106) (.101) (.102) (.105)
Sycophant – .055 – .064 – .073 – .072 – .061 – .050
(.025) (.025) (.027) (.024) (.024) (.024)
Broker .050 .057 .055 .064 .053 .043
(.020) (.020) (.023) (.019) (.019) (.020)
Receiver .268 .294 .298 .316 .290 .248
(.130) (.133) (.135) (.129) (.128) (.131)
Yrs. of schooling .152 .102 .146
completed (.014) (.016) (.014)
Married .053 .046 .059
(.011) (.011) (.011)
Job found via .013 .019 .021
informal contact (.024) (.011) (.011)
Occupation
dummies yes yes
Social participa-
tion variables yes
Observations 2,514 2,514 2,514 2,514 2,514 2,514
Adjusted R2 .224 .185 .177 .266 .286 .244
F -statistic typology 13.42 15.67 17.01 20.88 15.77 10.41
Note.— Standard errors are in parentheses. Log hourly wages and controls are in mean-
deviation form; the constant term is suppressed. All specifications control for high school fixed
effects and include indicator variables for parental education and occupation as well as contin-
uous controls for the number of siblings and iq-scores (see Table A1 for descriptives).
TABLE A1
Summary Statistics of Selected Control Variables
by Network Position:
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Isolate Sycophant Broker Receiver
Mother’s schooling:
attended high school .442 (.497 ) .486 .470 .420 .375
has college degree .089 (.286 ) .033 .089 .095 .104
Father’s schooling:
attended high school .518 (.500 ) .554 .513 .527 .417
has college degree .091 (.288 ) .087 .087 .097 .065
IQ-score 101.94 (15.14 ) 99.40 100.01 103.82 100.13
No. of member-
ships in org. (log) .936 (.715 ) .680 .887 .997 .972
Freq. of contact
with friends (log) .992 (.780 ) .879 .962 1.045 .786
Freq. of contact
with relatives (log) .913 (.742 ) .852 .895 .947 .746
Yrs. of schooling
completed 14.05 (2.51 ) 13.41 13.74 14.34 14.17
Married .867 (.340 ) .801 .848 .884 .917
Job found via
informal contact .408 (.492 ) .267 .403 .425 .438
Note.— The sample consists of 2,514 full-time employed male workers, WLS, at age 53. Esti-
mated means by network position are corrected for misclassification error.
FIGURE 1 — An Exemplary High School Class
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